ZeroTrust has become the default security doctrine.
Verify everything. Trust nothing. Assume breach.
At least, that is the theory.
In practice, most Zero Trust strategies stop at identity and network controls.Multi factor authentication. Conditional access. Micro segmentation. Privileged access management.
All important. All necessary.
None of them protect the place that matters most.
The data.
Modern Zero Trust architectures are built around access.
Who can log in.
From where.
Using what device.
Under what conditions.
If those signals look good, access is granted.
But once inside, most storage systems still operate on implicit trust. If credentials are valid, the system assumes intent is valid. Administrative access remains absolute. Control planes remain centralized. Recovery systems remain reachable.
ZeroTrust often stops at the door of the data layer.
That is where ransomware lives.
Attackers do not need to break encryption. They do not need to exploit storage protocols.
They need credentials.
Compromised identity is the most common root cause of major breaches. Once administrative access is obtained, attackers inherit the same authority your systems rely on:
From the system’s perspective, these are legitimate actions.
If your storage trusts identity absolutely, your Zero Trust strategy collapses the moment identity is compromised.
And identity will be compromised.
TrueZero Trust cannot stop at network segmentation or access control. It must extend to how data is stored, protected, and recovered.
If an attacker gains administrative access today, can they destroy your ability to recover?
Inmost environments, the answer is yes.
Cloud,on premises, hybrid. It does not matter. Centralized control planes remain a single point of authority. Recovery systems remain reachable. Storage remains mutable under administrative control.
That is not Zero Trust.
That is conditional trust.
Most storage architectures depend on a central system that governs data placement,immutability, retention, and deletion.
Compromise that system, and you compromise everything attached to it.
ZeroTrust networking does not fix centralized storage.
Zero Trust identity does not fix centralized storage.
If the control plane can be altered, so can the data.
Attackers understand this. That is why modern ransomware targets backups and recovery first. Not because defenses are weak, but because architectures are predictable.
Centralization is leverage.
If you truly assume breach, then storage must be designed to survive it.
That means: Immutability that cannot be reversed by compromised credentials.
Protection that happens at write time, not on a schedule.
Recovery that does not depend on a single system, region, or vendor.
Architecture that limits the blast radius of administrative compromise.
ZeroTrust must be structural, not procedural.
Myota was built on the assumption that identity and networks will eventually fail.
The Shard and Spread™ architecture shards and spreads encrypted, post quantum protected data across multiple independent storage locations. Each shard is immutable. No single control plane, credential set, or storage provider can delete or corrupt the protected state of your data.
Ina default configuration, only two Shard Repositories need to remain available for recovery. Those repositories can exist anywhere. Two on premises. Two in AWS. Two in Wasabi. Any combination. As long as any two remain accessible,recovery is possible.
ZeroTrust becomes architectural.
Not aspirational.
ZeroTrust strategies that ignore storage are incomplete.
You cannot verify your way out of a centralized design.
You cannot authenticate your way out of administrative authority.
If your data ultimately trusts a single system to behave correctly, your ZeroTrust strategy has a blind spot.
And attackers know exactly where it is.
The future of Zero Trust is not more policy. It is better architecture.
Until Zero Trust includes the data layer, it is not Zero Trust at all.